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It is commonly assumed that tax collection is an inherent 
function of government. Prior to the introduction of a com-
prehensive bureaucracy, governments commonly contracted 
with private agencies, known as “tax farmers,” to enhance 
their tax collection capacities. During the 19th century, the 
use of tax farmers declined with the institutionalization of 
the administrative bureaucracy.
Since the 1980s, state governments in the United States 
have reintroduced tax farming as a facilitator and expediter in 
the delinquent tax collection process. In 1978, New Mexico 
reintroduced the contracting out of delinquent taxes with pri-
vate collection agencies. Currently, several states (e.g., 
Colorado, New Jersey, and Illinois) use private debt collec-
tion companies for delinquent tax collection, whereas others 
(e.g., Arizona, Tennessee, and Washington) do not outsource 
delinquent tax collection. These tax collection practices raise 
the question of what results can be observed from state gov-
ernments’ contracting out delinquent tax collection with pri-
vate companies? The literature on tax farming and theory of 
agency imply that tax collection contracting out would be 
administratively effective and efficient, but may induce pro-
cedural bias by encouraging private tax collectors to exploit 
taxpayers in maximizing their expected return. This article 
empirically explores the implication to administrative effec-
tiveness, efficiency, and procedural fairness when a state gov-
ernment contracts out delinquent tax collections using state 
panel data for the years 2000 to 2011.
Tax delinquency is defined as the “failure of timely pay-
ment of tax due” (Mikesell, 1976). Like tax evasion, tax 
delinquency damages the government’s fiscal health in terms 
of revenue and equity. Tax delinquency leads to revenue loss 
and increasing costs of collection. The government is com-
pelled to implement enforcement collection processes that 
are costlier to both the government and the taxpayer. Tax 
delinquency can be seen as a mechanism that can shift honest 
taxpayers toward noncompliance, leading to a violation of 
the equity principal in taxation. Reduced compliance rates 
decrease tax revenue and increase tax collection cost in the 
long run.
This article contributes to practice in tax collection and 
the literature on tax administration and contracting out. The 
empirical results of this study on states’ alternative tax col-
lection practices provide useful implications to state and 
local tax administrators. It provides insight for federal tax 
administrators who have been considering contracting out 
the collection of delinquent federal income tax with private 
debt collection companies since the 1990s. One of the 
current issues in government administration has been the 
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growth in delinquencies and the effects on service provision 
and taxpayer burdens. In fiscal year 2011, the federal unpaid 
tax debt inventory rose to US$373.2 billion (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2012), a 29% increase over the 
US$290.1 billion unpaid inventory of 2007 (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2008). This growth in delinquency is 
apparent at the state level where contemporary research 
shows an increase in tax amnesty programs since 2000, an 
attempt to recover the growth in tax delinquency in sales and 
other taxes (Mikesell & Ross, 2012).
Changes in collection administration are associated with 
the dilemma of effective and efficient collection and the pro-
tection of taxpayers’ rights due to the potentially invasive col-
lection behavior of debt collection companies. If the 
government can collect tax receivables effectively and effi-
ciently through private collection agencies, the outcome can 
lead to an increase in revenues without affecting either the tax 
base or rate while protecting taxpayers. Tax collection out-
sourcing would be a way to mitigate fiscal hardship given that 
increased collection leads to higher revenues. Increased col-
lections have the potential to reduce politically unpopular 
decisions such as tax rate changes, may enhance services due 
to increased revenues, and provide citizens the opportunity to 
observe “fairness” in the revenue collection process given 
that each citizen is treated similarly by public administrators.
This article contributes to the literature on contracting and 
tax administration. While the public administration literature 
on contracting tends to focus on the spending side of govern-
ment functions, provision of public services, this study 
explores the revenue side of government functions, funding 
of public service. While much of the literature in tax admin-
istration focuses on tax evasion, this study addresses tax 
delinquency and explores tax collection outsourcing through 
an empirical evaluation.
The following sections present an overview of the previ-
ous literature on contracting, tax administration, and tax col-
lection outsourcing, highlighting key propositions. The 
hypotheses are then developed based on the propositions. An 
overview of the states’ current delinquent tax collection out-
sourcing practice and a discussion on measurement of agency 
costs in tax collection is then pursued. Attention is turned to 
the regression models and data. Finally, a presentation of the 
empirical results is offered followed by the implication of the 
results.
Literature Review
Since the 1980s, a growing attention to alternative service 
delivery has led to the extant literature on contracting out and 
privatization. Within the literature is the normative argument 
about whether to contract out, along with the issues underly-
ing this choice (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006; Fosler, 
1978; Milward & Provan, 2000; R. C. Moe, 1987; Park, 
1987; Poole & Fixler, 1987; Prager, 1994; Sappington & 
Stiglitz, 1987; Sullivan, 1987) and a rich history of empirical 
studies assessing the contracting out of multiple functions, 
for example, garbage collection, education, defense, police, 
prison, social service, and so on (Boyne, 1998; Marvel & 
Marvel, 2007; Ni & Bretschneider, 2007; Pack, 1989; 
Romzek & Johnston, 2005). In terms of financial manage-
ment and budgeting, these previous studies on contracting 
out explore the expenditure side of government functions. 
There is limited empirical research on the revenue side impli-
cations of contracting out. In addition to the research that 
focuses on either the expenditure or revenue side, there is a 
limited literature on contracting out that includes both expen-
diture and revenue implication of governance structure (da 
Cruz, Berg, & Marques, 2013; Liu, Hotchkiss, & Bose, 
2008). This literature is focused on fee-based activities, such 
as public utilities and health care services, rather than gen-
eral fund or tax-based activities such as tax collection.
In tax administration, it is important not only to detect 
underreported taxes but also to collect reported taxes. Since 
Becker’s (1968) work on the economics of crime and punish-
ment, along with Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) and 
Srinivasan’s (1973) work on tax evasion, the economic lit-
erature on tax compliance has focused on tax evasion while 
ignoring the role of tax collection. Subsequently, Mikesell’s 
(1974) work on tax administration introduced the public 
administration literature to tax compliance with the majority 
of the studies concentrating on tax evasion issues, such as tax 
audit and amnesty (Denison & Eger, 2000; Eger & Hackbart, 
2005; Luitel & Sobel, 2007; Mikesell, 1984; Mikesell & 
Ross, 2012; Parle & Hirlinger, 1986; Song & Yarbrough, 
1978). While there are some studies on tax delinquently in 
the public administration literature, such as Mikesell’s (1976) 
study on economic factors influencing property tax delin-
quency and Snavely’s (1988, 1989) survey on strategies and 
tools for tax compliance and delinquency control, there is 
little empirical work on the effects of alternative tax delin-
quency control methods.
Historical studies on tax farming (Webber & Wildavsky, 
1986; Azabou & Nugent, 1988, 1989; Kiser, 1994; Levi, 
1988; Ma, 2003; White, 2004) provide a key proposition 
about tax collection outsourcing, tax farming was finan-
cially/administratively effective and efficient but it indicated 
the potential for the mistreatment of taxpayers. Based on this 
historical lesson, multiple disciplines have studied the impact 
of contracting out tax collection in a contemporary context, 
for example, private tax collection studies attentive to legal-
ity (Alexander, 2000; Melita, 1997; Poindexter, Rogovoy, & 
Wachter, 1997; Resnick, 2005; C. N. Smith, 1997), public 
administration (Hood, 1986; Byrne, 1995; Iversen, Fjeldstad, 
Bahiigwa, Ellis, & James, 2006), public policy (Kiser & 
Baker, 1994; Stella, 1993), and economics (Cosgel & Miceli, 
2009; Escobari, 2012; Toma & Toma, 1992). Although these 
studies provide rich theoretical arguments about the applica-
bility of the old idea of tax farming to contemporary tax col-
lection issue, they do not offer any concrete empirical 
evidence based on contemporary data.
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Theory of Agency
This study adopts the theory of agency (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Mirrlees, 1976a, 1976b; Ross, 1973) as a framework 
to conceptualize the tax collector’s behavior and level of col-
lection effort in a delegated contract setting under different 
contract forms. Expansion and application of the framework 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) regarding ownership struc-
ture, and Mirrlees’s (1976b) work on optimal structure of 
incentives and authority, are notable. Further interest in pub-
lic policy and administration are found in studies on the rela-
tionship between the bureaucracy and elected officials 
(Mitnick 1973, 1975; T. M. Moe, 1982, 1984; B. D. Wood & 
Waterman, 1991; Wood & Waterman, 1993) and the budget-
ary relationship (R. W. Smith & Bertozzi, 1998).
Using the theory of agency, tax revenue is produced 
through combining the tax base, tax rate, and the tax admin-
istrator’s collection effort. The politicians first determine tax 
rates and bases by passing tax legislation, but tax revenue is 
not automatically generated. The process requires a tax col-
lection effort. To realize tax revenue, tax administrators, such 
as state tax departments and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), implement tax legislation by inputting a tax collection 
effort. Without the collection effort, the government would 
have tax receivables with an unknown amount of tax reve-
nue. Thus, the level of tax revenue depends on the level of 
the tax collector’s collection effort, holding other factors 
constant. This allows the government the opportunity to indi-
rectly choose the level of effort of the tax collection agent by 
offering different compensation schemes to maximize its tax 
revenue. In the theory of agency, the agent’s behavior is usu-
ally interpreted as level of effort.
In a delegation situation, the agent’s behavior usually 
deviates from the principal’s intention. To mitigate the 
agency problem, which introduces agency cost, the principal 
selects a compensation system. The principal (the govern-
ment) can incentivize the agent (the tax collector) to exert a 
high level of effort to implement his or her delegated tasks by 
offering performance-based compensation, such as fixed-
rent or revenue share contracts. Alternatively, the principal 
can force the agent to input a minimal necessary level of 
effort by setting a monitoring system with fixed compensa-
tion, such as wage contracts under the in-house system. Thus, 
the contract form represents the compensation scheme.
There are alternative theories to the theory of agency. Self-
regulation theories concentrate on intrinsic sociopsychologi-
cal factors whereas the theory of agency focuses on extrinsic 
financial compensation to motivate employees to improve 
their performance. The theory of agency argues that if there is 
no functional relationship between public sector employee’s 
performance and his or her financial reward, the public sector 
employee is likely to shirk. Thus, agency theory suggests 
performance-based financial rewards to encourage the public 
employee to increase their level of effort. Alternatively, self-
regulation theories, such as the self-determination theory 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000), the social cognitive theory 
(Bandura, 1986, 1988; R. Wood & Bandura, 1989; Wright, 
2004), and public service motivation theory (Perry & Wise, 
1990), argue that a public employee’s motivation (level of 
effort) is based on the public goods and services accomplish-
ments because public service organizations focus on achiev-
ing mission-centered goals. These self-regulation theories 
argue that public employees are motivated because their jobs 
are meaningful. To improve employees’ performance, self-
regulation theories suggest designing jobs and tasks to satisfy 
the public employee’s psychological needs.
We believe that a balanced idea of motivation should be 
used to fully understand public sector employees’ because 
the public employee is motivated by both the external mon-
etary reward and the internal psychological reward. However, 
this article adopts the theory of agency to measure the effect 
of incentive-based tax collection, the use of the private tax 
collector, on collection performance. The fact that many 
state governments have been using private tax collectors 
based on an incentive-based contract implicitly indicates that 
delinquent tax collection outsourcing practices are built on 
the theory of agency. State governments have questioned the 
public tax collector’s performance, which has contributed to 
the state governments’ adoption of pay-for-performance 
incentive contracts with private collectors. This action is dif-
ferent than the alternative, which would have been motivat-
ing the public collector through psychological mechanisms 
such as professional norms, standards, or intrinsic mission 
orientation. If the effect of incentive-based tax collection on 
collection performance, such as administrative effectiveness, 
efficiency, and procedural fairness, is not significant, then we 
may conjecture that the public tax collectors’ intrinsic moti-
vation factors may have an effect on the results.
Contract Forms and Trade-Off of 
Agency Costs
In the theory of agency, tax collections are categorized by the 
compensation scheme into the following three forms: fixed-
wage, fixed-rent, and revenue share contracts. The fixed-
wage (or hierarchy-oriented) contract is a control-based, 
low-powered scheme whereas the fixed-rent and revenue 
share contracts are incentive-based (or market-oriented) con-
tracts, which are high-powered incentive schemes.
From the perspective of agency theory, a bureaucratic in-
house tax collection system is viewed as a fixed-wage con-
tract, where the public employee tax collectors are 
theoretically seen to choose a low level of effort, thereby 
shirking, because there is no direct functional relationship 
between the agent’s performance and compensation. 
Although employee wages may increase or change in the 
long run, it is rare for the public agent to immediately receive 
financial compensation corresponding to his or her perfor-
mance. Recently, the compensation structure to incentivize 
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public employees has become similar to outcome-based 
compensation in private firms (i.e., bonus incentives); how-
ever, this is not observed in the tax collection performance of 
either the IRS or state governments. Under the fixed-wage 
contract, it is expected that the tax collection employee will 
choose a low level of effort in the collection of delinquent 
taxes. This expectation reduces the possibility of conflicts 
between tax collectors and taxpayers. The growth in delin-
quent taxes may be partially attributable to the nonincentive 
nature of the fixed-wage contract.
Contrary to the fixed-wage contract, the collectors’ level 
of effort and return, in a tax-farming contract, incentivizes 
the private tax collector to choose a higher level of effort. 
There are two types of tax-farming contracts, a fixed-rent 
contract and a revenue share contract. In a fixed-rent con-
tract, the private tax collector is likely to choose the highest 
level of collection effort because the collector owns the 
rights to the taxes collected. In the contemporary situation, 
property tax sales can be viewed as a fixed-rent contract of 
tax farming. Local government sells off their property tax 
uncollectable accounts at a discounted price.
In a revenue share contract, the private collector is likely 
to choose a modest level of collection effort, which is lower 
than the effort under a fixed-rent contract but is higher than 
the effort under a fixed-wage contract. In the contemporary 
situation, state governments utilize a revenue share contract 
under which states hire private collection agencies to collect 
their delinquent taxes and pay the private agency a propor-
tion of the delinquent taxes collected. In the current U.S. debt 
collection industry, most third-party debt collection contracts 
are revenue share contracts, under which the private debt 
collector receives a commission, which is usually about 25% 
of collected revenue (Association of Credit and Collection 
International, 2007). In many private debt collection compa-
nies, “to motivate staff, private collectors routinely use col-
lection performance statistics as a basis for evaluating their 
collectors and for determining compensation and incentive 
awards” (U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1993). It can 
be expected, under commission-based or revenue-based con-
tracts, that the private collection agent inputs a higher level 
of effort to collect taxes to maximize its financial share as 
compared with the effort under a fixed-wage contract. Given 
the competitive nature of the private debt collection, this 
market will induce private collector firms to engage in bid-
ding for state tax collection accounts. As identified by Melita 
(1997), “the field of private debt collection is densely popu-
lated. Some 3,700 firms belong to the ACA nationwide” (p. 
714).
Given the private tax collection marketplace, tax farming 
may solve the problem of a tax collector’s shirking behavior 
under the fixed-wage contract but may lead to harassment or 
mistreatment of taxpayers due to overzealous collection 
efforts. This outcome leads to a trade-off between shirking 
and overzealous collection, which is consistent with the 
trade-off between two competing administrative values in 
tax collection: financial administrative effectiveness and 
efficiency and procedural fairness. Contracting out tax col-
lections may be administratively effective and efficient but 
can introduce negative effects on procedural fairness.
State Delinquent Tax Collection 
Outsourcing Practices
According to the data collected through emails, 29 states cur-
rently use private collectors, four states have prior experi-
ence using private collection agencies but currently do not 
use private collectors, six states have never used private col-
lection agencies, and 11 states did not response to our email. 
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office’s 1994 
report on state delinquent tax collection methods and our 
information collected by email responses from state tax col-
lection agencies, since the 1980s, many state governments 
have been using private debt collection agencies, such as pri-
vate collection companies and law firms, as facilitators and 
expediters for state delinquent taxes including individual 
income tax, corporate income tax, sales and use taxes, 
employment tax, and other taxes.
The contemporary contracting out-of-state delinquent tax 
collection is not a pure form of tax farming. Although the 
early historical tax farming was completely privatized, the 
contemporary contracting out is a hybrid-privatized tax col-
lection system. In other words, the early historical tax farm-
ing was a substitute for the underdeveloped bureaucratic 
collection system, whereas the current outsourcing of delin-
quent tax collection supplements the public tax collection 
agencies. While under the early history of tax-farming con-
tract, private tax collectors did all collections, the state main-
tains collection efforts and contract for some subset of 
delinquent accounts.
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office’s 
(GAO) 1994 report, there is a usual process that the states 
refer delinquent cases to private collectors, although some 
variation exists. Usually, over a period of about 4 months, the 
state sends three bills, which is the median number of collec-
tion bills. Then, the state starts to expedite the collection pro-
cess, for example, using automated telephone collection, 
arranged personal face-to-face meetings with delinquent tax-
payers, and license and permit enforcement programs. If the 
state tax collection agencies fail to contact or collect from a 
delinquent taxpayer within about 12 months, delinquent 
cases are referred to private collectors. Twelve months is the 
median age for delinquent cases referred to private collector 
while the range is 3 to 24 months. For dollar values, the 
median dollar amount for cases referred to private collectors 
is US$400, with a range of US$100–US$10,000.
Although there may be variation among states, the private 
collection agency assists state collection agencies in many 
ways, including locating delinquent taxpayers, making tele-
phone calls to remind taxpayers of tax delinquencies, mail-
ing tax notices, and establishing repayment agreements. 
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Collection agencies’ suggest various payment methods such 
as cash, credit card, and installment payments, along with 
offering compromises, which are legal contracts between 
delinquent taxpayers and states to settle delinquent taxes for 
less than the amount of the delinquent taxes owed. Collection 
agencies may be allowed to enforce administrative wage gar-
nishment payments and resolve delinquent taxes administra-
tively by determining that a delinquent taxpayer is deceased, 
bankrupt, or out of business.
This article attempts to capture the impact of private tax 
collectors on tax collection performance, such as efficiency 
and effectiveness and fairness, by comparing states using 
state tax department employees only and states using both 
their tax department and private collection agencies. If there 
is a difference between these two state groupings, the differ-
ence may be due to the use of private collection agencies.
Measurement of Agency Costs in Tax 
Collection
In measuring agency costs, administrative effectiveness, 
efficiency, and procedural fairness are important managerial 
values. However, there is a potential trade-off among these 
values. Administratively effective and efficient tax collection 
processes may lead to a negative effect on procedural fair-
ness. To abide by legal requirements to minimize the tax-
payer’s loss from overzealous collection, a sacrifice in 
administrative effectiveness and efficiency may be required. 
The objective of the tax collector is to maximize tax revenue 
at minimum cost while integrating a fair procedure. We try to 
measure the effect of the use of private collectors on delin-
quent tax collection performance in terms of administrative 
effectiveness, efficiency, and procedural fairness.
Administrative Effectiveness and Efficiency
According to the theory of agency, the cost of shirking in 
organizations leads to a low level of performance due to a 
lack of incentives. A rationale for the use of private tax col-
lectors is that states can expect an effective and efficient tax 
collection. The General Accounting Office’s (1994) report 
indicated that “state tax departments use private collection 
companies to take advantage of their vast collection experi-
ence, to gain state-of-the-art computer technology for man-
aging receivables, to avoid the expense of hiring permanent 
staff, and to supplement their own collection staff” (p. 10).
Administrative effectiveness of tax administration refers 
to the extent to which the tax collector collects the tax receiv-
able. To measure administrative effectiveness in tax adminis-
tration, this article uses the amount of tax receivable 
inventory. The variable is normalized by state tax revenue. 
To measure delinquent tax collection performance, the level 
of tax receivables is used as the proxy. The ideal measure of 
delinquent tax collection performance would be to measure 
the level of delinquent tax inventory itself. None of states, 
however, report the amount of delinquent taxes indepen-
dently of tax receivables. To assure that delinquent tax inven-
tory is accessible, each state’s Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFRs) are evaluated. Delinquent tax 
inventory amounts were not provided in this public informa-
tion. Although state CAFRs did not provide delinquent tax 
inventory amounts, most CAFR’s provided the amount of tax 
receivables. The amount of tax receivables is an aggregated 
amount of accumulated delinquent taxes, current delinquent 
taxes, and current tax receivables. In terms of generally 
accepted accounting principles, while tax receivables are not 
identical to delinquent taxes, tax receivables incorporate the 
broader concept of delinquent taxes. In practice, federal and 
state governments use both the level of tax receivables and 
delinquent taxes to assess tax collection performance (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2013; Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts, 2014).
Administrative efficiency of tax administration refers to 
the collection of taxes at the lowest possible cost. 
Administrative efficiency also refers to cost-effectiveness 
(Azabou & Nugent, 1988; Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). To 
measure the cost in tax administration, this article uses state 
tax department expenditures. The variable is normalized by 
state tax revenue. To measure administrative ineffectiveness 
due to shirking, this article uses the ratio of state tax depart-
ment expenditures to tax revenue. Although the proxy mea-
sure is imperfect, studies on agency problems have used a 
similar proxy—the ratio of operating expenses to sales as a 
proxy for shirking (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000; Ang & Cox, 
1997; Henry, 2010). Given that state tax department expendi-
tures imply operating costs for tax administration and collec-
tion, the face validity of the proxy appears prudent. The same 
logic holds for tax revenue given that tax revenue is appropri-
ately related to the amount of revenues to be collected.
The proxy, tax administration expenditure, includes con-
tract administration costs, which encompass the cost of mon-
itoring contractors. Contract cost may be estimated by using 
“10 to 20 percent of total contractor” rule or “the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) staffing formula indicated 
in OMB Circular A-76” (Martin, 1992). Due to limited 
accessibility to the data on contract administration costs, this 
article concentrates on overall tax administration costs, 
which are inclusive of administration costs of tax collection 
outsourcing.
Procedural Fairness
As administrative effectiveness and efficiency in tax collec-
tion are financial measures, they may not capture administra-
tive quality in tax collection, such as how tax collectors treat 
taxpayers. To address administrative quality, especially pro-
cedural fairness, this article uses taxpayer appeals. Procedural 
fairness in tax collection refers to the collection of taxes 
through legal and due processes to prevent the collector from 
mistreating taxpayers and misusing taxpayer information. 
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The tax-farming literature and agency theory implies that 
private tax collectors are likely to violate procedural fairness 
in the tax enforcement process. For example, tax collectors 
may mistreat taxpayers by
harassing the alleged debtor—taxpayers as tax debtors—or 
others, demand a larger payment than is permitted by law, fail to 
send required debtor notice, threaten dire consequences if debtor 
fails to pay, fail to identify self as debt collector, revealing 
alleged debt to third parties, give impermissible calls to debtor’s 
place of employment, fail to verify disputed debt, and continue 
to contact debtor after receiving cease communication notice. 
(U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2011, pp. 6-9)
When taxpayers experience improper collection practices 
by state and state-hired private collection agencies, they may 
file a petition for review with the state tax department and /
or the state’s independent tax appeal agencies, which include 
boards of tax appeals, state tax courts, and the traditional 
court system.1 Although tax administration consists of six 
phases: discovery, valuation, collection, audit, enforcement, 
and appeal or protest (Mikesell, 1974), the tax administration 
literature tends to ignore the role of taxpayer appeal or pro-
test. In the appeal/protest phase, two types of tax appeals are 
observable, tax appeals internal to state tax departments 
(internal) and tax appeals that are external of state tax depart-
ments (external). Internal tax appeals are informal confer-
ences or hearings that are filed and conducted by a division 
within the state tax department. External tax appeals are filed 
with the independent tax appeal forum. As noted in Mikesell 
(1974), taxpayers use the administrative appeal process 
within tax administration or through the judicial system to 
address issues of legality, equitability, or fair treatment. The 
tax appeal process has critical implications for contemporary 
tax collection. Institutionalization of the appeal process is 
one instrument to ensure the “quality” of tax administration.
To measure procedural fairness, the number of tax 
appeals is used. Although it is difficult to calculate the costs 
associated with tax appeals in monetary terms, it is mean-
ingful to evaluate the effects of tax collection by using tax 
appeal caseloads. Two proxies, the number of tax appeals 
filed with state tax departments and the number of tax 
appeals filed with independent tax appeal agencies, are used 
as proxies for procedural fairness. Table 1 provides a sum-
mary of the framework.
Hypotheses and Models
The empirical tests concentrate on comparing differences of 
agency costs between states using private collectors and 
states using public collectors for collection of delinquent 
taxes. Data are for the years 2000 to 2011. The authors mea-
sure the difference in agency cost of shirking between wage 
and share contracts, and the difference in agency cost of 
overenforcement between wage and share contracts. They 
advance the following hypotheses based on the extant 
literature:
Hypothesis 1: Tax collection outsourcing will increase 
tax appeals filed to tax court.
Hypothesis 2: Tax collection outsourcing will increase 
tax appeals filed in the state tax department.
Hypothesis 3: Tax collection outsourcing will reduce tax 
collection cost.
Hypothesis 4: Tax collection outsourcing will reduce tax 
receivables inventory.
To estimate the effect of collector type on nonfinancial 
outcomes, in particular, procedural fairness as offered in 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, a random effects model is 
employed. The assumption is that the collection method, pri-
vate or public, can be strictly exogenous to the number of tax 
appeals because filing tax appeals can be considered inde-
pendent of the collector type. To test this strict exogeneity 
assumption, a Hausman (1978) test is performed. The results 
of the Hausman test for Hypothesis 1 (χ2 = 9.39, p > .153) 
and Hypothesis 2 (χ2 = 7.03, p > .318) lead to our analysis 
using the random effects estimator for both these hypotheses. 
Given that the Hausman (1978) test can lead to erroneous 
outcomes, we enhance the Hausman results by following 
Allison’s (2009) hybrid estimation technique. In this hybrid 
method, the time-varying independent variables are trans-
formed into deviations from their state-specific means (this 
is identical to fixed effects). This technique also includes the 
state-specific means for each of the time-varying indepen-
dent variables. The dependent variables are then regressed 
on the deviations and means using the random effects model 
to ensure that the standard errors reflect the dependence 
among the multiple observations for each state. Postestimation 
tests are conducted on whether or not the mean variables are 
Table 1. Analytic Framework: Public Versus Private Tax Collection Method.
Collection method Collector Contract form Agency cost Managerial value Measures
Tax farming Private agency Revenue share Overenforcement Procedural fairness Appeals filed in independent 
tax court
Appeals filed in tax department
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equal to the deviation variables. If the assumption of the ran-
dom effects model is correct (i.e., the α
i
 term is uncorrelated 
with the independent variables), then the deviation coeffi-
cient should be the same as the mean coefficient for each 
variable. Using this test, the results show that the mean coef-
ficients and the deviation coefficients do not statistically dif-
fer, thus the random effects model is appropriate.2
The following two regression analyses are conducted 
using the Prais–Winsten3 random effects estimation tech-
nique to measure the agency cost of overenforcement by 
using the number of tax appeals filed in the external tax court 
(Hypothesis 1) and the number of tax appeals filed in the 
internal tax department (Hypothesis 2).
Tax Appeal Tax Court PrivateCollection
Agency X





δ αi it+ ε ,
and
Tax Appeal Tax Department PrivateCollection
Agency  





δ α εX ,it i it+ +
where i represents indexed states, t represents indexes each 
year, and Xit  represents control variables.
To estimate the effects of collector type on administrative 
effectiveness and efficiency, as offered in Hypothesis 3 and 
Hypothesis 4, a fixed-effect model is used. The employment 
of the fixed-effect model assumes that collector type is more 
than likely endogenous. The assumption is that the type of 
collector will influence administrative costs and administra-
tive costs will influence collector type. In addition, it is 
assumed that paying taxes can be considered dependent on 
the collector type. Practitioners in the IRS have testified that 
the payment of taxes to a tax collecting agency is dependent 
on the collector type (Olson, 2007). The following two 
regression analyses are conducted to evaluate hypotheses 
three and four.
Collection Cost PrivateCollection














δ ε t .
Data
Table 2 shows each variable, its description, and data sources 
used in the regression models.
In the regression models, the key explanatory variable is 
PrivateCollection Agencyit, which indexed whether or not a 
state government contracts out delinquent tax collection with 
private debt collectors. The analyses focus on delinquent 
state tax debts only, excluding property tax and nontax rev-
enues, such as fees, charges, or revenues related to child sup-
port enforcement programs. This identifies income and sales 
taxes as the primary focus of the analysis. The private agency 
dummy variable is identified by each state tax department 
based on requests sent to the state tax agency. The requested 
information included whether or not a state used a private 
debt collection agency, the year the state began using the pri-
vate collector, and the state’s legal basis for use of the private 
collector. The request was sent by email and/or telephone 
contact. Table 3 shows each state’s agency responsible for 
tax collection and whether each state used a private collec-
tion agency to collect state delinquent taxes.
In the regression analyses, the dependent variables mea-
sure the agency costs of shirking and overenforcement. There 
are four dependent variables used in the measurement of 
agency costs. Two of these measures are associated with 
financial performance such as administrative efficiency and 
effectiveness in tax collection whereas the remaining two 
measures are related to procedural fairness. The first proxy to 
measure administrative efficiency of tax collection is the 
ratio of state tax department expenditures to total tax revenue 
collected. This proxy shows the administrative cost for col-
lecting US$1,000 of tax revenue. The data on tax revenue are 
taken from the U.S. Census and each state’s CAFR. Most 
data on state tax department expenditures are taken from the 
budgetary comparison schedule in the required supplemen-
tary information provided in each state’s CAFR. When one 
compares budgetary and finance data across states, they are 
confronted with a comparability issue given that each state 
may use different accounting and reporting principles to gen-
erate their budgetary and financial report. To mitigate the 
comparability issue of budgetary and financial data across 
states, the state’s CAFR is used. Although there may be slight 
differences in accounting principles across states, since 1999 
states have produced their CAFR based on the Governmental 
Accounting Standard Board’s (GASB) Statement 34. Under 
GASB Statement 34, state CAFRs are provided on an accrual 
accounting basis, with CAFRs audited by an independent 
certified public accountant and used by bond credit raters 
and investors to evaluate the state governments’ fiscal condi-
tion. If data were not available through the CAFR, annual 
reports of the state tax department or expenditure data were 
requested by email and telephone.
The second proxy to measure administrative effectiveness 
of tax collection is the ratio of tax receivables to total tax 
revenue collected. This proxy represents the amount of out-
standing tax receivable per US$1,000 of tax revenue. The 
data on taxes receivable are taken from each state CAFR.
To measure procedural fairness of tax collection two 
proxies are offered. The initial proxy for procedural fairness 
is the annual number of tax appeals filed in the independent 
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tax appeal forum. The second proxy is the annual number of 
tax appeals filed in the state’s tax department. The majority 
of the data on tax appeal caseloads are collected through 
requests via email and telephone contacts with the remainder 
of tax appeal caseloads provided in the tax appeal agency’s 
annual report. Although it may be appropriate for appeal 
caseloads to be standardized based on returns filed by each 
tax, such as income tax, sales taxes, and so on, this standard-
ization limits the analysis to data on a single tax. To avoid 
this limitation, tax appeal data used are aggregated nonprop-
erty tax totals, not tax-specific amounts, allowing for a rich 
variety of tax appeal cases.
Control variables included are tax base, tax burden, size 
of the state, economic fluctuation, political attitude, and 
experience of the state with private collectors. Tax base and 
tax burden variables are included to control for inputs in the 
revenue production function and isolate the level of the col-
lection effort. The tax base is measured as annual Gross State 
Product (GSP) per capita and the data are taken from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Tax burden is measured as 
tax-to-GSP ratio and the data are taken from the U.S. Census.
The size of the state, economic fluctuation, political atti-
tude, and state experience variables are included to control 
for state socioeconomic characteristics. The size of the state 
is measured by state population and data are taken from the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. Economic fluctuation over time is measured by the 
unemployment rate and the data are taken from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Each state’s political attitude 
is measured as the governor’s party and the data are taken 
from the Council of State Government’s Book of the States 
from 2000 to 2011. State experience with private collectors 
is taken from the state’s information regarding when they 
began using private tax collection agencies. Tables 4 and 5 
provide the descriptive statistics for each variable broken 
down by whether or not the state uses private tax collectors.
Empirical Result
Table 6 reports the results of the four different regressions 
representing the four hypothesized effects. In the first regres-
sion (Tax Court), the effect of collector type on external tax 
appeals is estimated. In the second regression (Tax 
Department), the effect of collector type on internal tax 
department appeals is measured. In the third regression 
(Collection Costs), the effect of collector type on collection 
Table 2. Variable Description and Data Sources.
Variables Descriptions Sources
Dependent variables
 Agency cost 
(Shirking)
Tax administration cost per tax revenue (in 
thousands)
Taxes receivable (delinquent tax inventory) 
per tax revenue (in thousands)
Each state’s CAFR
Each state tax department’s Annual Report
U.S. Bureau of Census
 Agency cost 
(Overenforcement)
Number of tax appeals (external) per capita 
(in thousands)
Number of tax appeals (internal) per capita 
(in thousands)
Data and information provided by state tax 
departments and tax courts collected by email and 
telephone contacts
Explanatory variable
 Private collection agent 
dummy
1 = Tax collection outsourcing
0 = In-house tax collection
Data and information provided by state tax 
departments and tax courts collected by email and 
telephone contacts
Control variables
Tax base GSP per capita (in thousands) BEA
U.S. Bureau of Census
Tax burden Tax-to-GSP rate (%) U.S. Bureau of Census
BEA
Size of state Natural log of population U.S. Bureau of Census’ Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Economic fluctuation Annual unemployment rate (%) BLS
Political attitude Governor’s party:
0 = Democrat or Independent
1 = Republican
Council of State Government’s The Book of the States
Experience with private 
collector
Number of years of experience with private 
collection agency
Data and Information provided by state tax 
departments and tax courts collected by email and 
telephone contacts
Note. CAFR = Comprehensive Annual Financial Report; BEA = U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; BLS = U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; GSP = Gross 
State Product.
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Table 3. State Agency Responsible for Tax Collection and Private Collection Agency.
State State agency responsible for tax collection Private collection agency
Alabama Dept. of Revenue Never used
Alaska Dept. of Revenue Only from 2006 to 2007
Arizona Dept. of Revenue Never used
Arkansas Dept. of Finance and Administration Never used
California Franchise Tax Board and Board of Equalization Since 1984
Colorado Dept. of Revenue Since the 1990s
Connecticut Dept. of Revenue Services Unknown
Delaware Dept. of Finance Unknown
Florida Dept. of Revenue Since the 1990s
Georgia Dept. of Revenue Since 1996
Hawaii Dept. of Taxation Used until 2000 and then discontinued
Idaho Tax Commission Used until 2009 and then discontinued
Illinois Dept. of Revenue Since the 1990s
Indiana Dept. of Revenue Unknown
Iowa Dept. of Revenue Since the 2000s
Kansas Dept. of Revenue Since 1996
Kentucky Dept. of Revenue Used until the 1990s and then discontinued
Louisiana Dept. of Revenue Since 1997
Maine Dept. of Administrative and Financial Services Since the 1990s
Maryland Comptroller Since 1994
Massachusetts Dept. of Revenue Currently in use, but unknown starting year
Michigan Dept. of Treasury Since 1987
Minnesota Dept. of Revenue Unknown
Mississippi Dept. of Revenue Since the 1990s
Missouri Dept. of Revenue Since 1983
Montana Dept. of Revenue from 2004 to 2007 and from 2009 to present
Nebraska Dept. of Revenue Since 2007
Nevada Dept. of Taxation Unknown
New Hampshire Dept. of Revenue Administration Unknown
New Jersey Division of Taxation Since 1992
New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept. Since 1978
New York Dept. of Taxation and Finance Since the 1990s
North Carolina Dept. of Revenue Unknown
North Dakota Office of State Tax Commissioner Unknown
Ohio Dept. of Taxation Currently use, but unknown starting year
Oklahoma Tax Commission Unknown
Oregon Dept. of Revenue Since 1994
Pennsylvania Dept. of Revenue Unknown
Rhode Island Dept. of Revenue Unknown
South Carolina Dept. of Revenue and Regulation Since 1994
South Dakota Dept. of Revenue Since 2004
Tennessee Dept. of Revenue Never used
Texas Office of the Texas Comptroller Since 2000
Utah Tax Commission Since 1994
Vermont Dept. of Taxes Since 1996
Virginia Dept. of Taxation Since the 1990s
Washington Dept. of Revenue Never used
West Virginia Tax Dept. Since the 1990s
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue Since the 1990s
Wyoming Dept. of Revenue Never used
Note. Dept. = Department.
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costs is measured. Finally, in the fourth regression (Tax 
Inventory), the effect of collector type on delinquent tax is 
measured. All results include control variables along with 
controls for time and the autoregressive nature of the 
correlations.
Observing the overall statistical explanatory power of the 
models, all four models have modest explanatory power. The 
first regression model (Tax Court) explains about 17% of 
variation in the caseloads of external tax appeals. The second 
regression model (Tax Department) explains about 27% of 
variation in the tax appeal caseload of the internal tax depart-
ment. The third regression model explains about 38% of the 
variation in collection costs. The fourth regression model 
explains about 13% of variation of delinquent tax inventory.
Beginning with the two results focused on procedural 
fairness, as measured using tax appeals, the finding is that 
private collection reduces the number of external tax appeals 
filed in tax court by about 11 cases per 100,000 population. 
With the average state having a population of about 6 million 
people, the effect is a nontrivial decrease in external tax 
appeals. This outcome leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 1, 
where it was inferred that using a tax farmer (private tax col-
lector) would increase tax appeals filed in tax courts. The 
coefficient for private collection on tax appeals within the 
state tax department indicates that private collectors are sim-
ilar to public collectors, leading to a rejection of the second 
hypothesis. This indicates that the administrative burden 
within the department is similar regardless of the tax collec-
tor type. This result is confounded for states with private tax 
collectors and a Republican governor. For those states, the 
effect is that the private tax collector increases the number of 
internal tax appeals filed in the tax department by about 12 
cases per 100,000 population.
Explaining these observed effects of tax collection out-
sourcing on procedural fairness, let us begin with why the 
internal administrative burden is found to be similar regardless 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for States With Private Collection Agency.
Variable n M SD Minimum Maximum
Regression 1 (Tax Court)
 Number of tax appeals per capita 117 0.07 0.09 0.001 0.43
 Gross State Product 117 42.65 8.38 25.32 80.05
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 117 5.71 1.05 3.22 8.38
 Population 117 8.91 0.95 6.51 10.53
 Unemployment rate 117 6.13 2.12 3.30 13.40
 Republican Governor 117 0.42 a 0 1
 Experience with private collector 117 15.09 5.28 1 27
Regression 2 (Tax Dept.)
 Number of tax appeals per capita 33 0.23 0.22 0.015 0.70
 Gross State Product 33 38.94 8.41 29.55 65.47
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 33 5.63 1.03 4.27 8.28
 Population 33 7.82 0.38 6.52 8.03
 Unemployment rate 33 5.46 2.10 2.60 10.70
 Republican Governor 33 0.64 a 0 1
 Experience with private collector 33 10.58 6.33 1 22
Regression 3 (Collection Costs)
 Collection Cost per tax revenue 145 37.42 53.13 1.22 362.56
 Gross State Product 145 39.75 7.25 24.67 65.47
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 145 5.30 1.44 3.22 8.38
 Population 145 8.33 0.97 6.52 10.50
 Unemployment rate 145 5.73 2.11 2.30 13.40
 Republican Governor 145 0.58 a 0 1
 Experience with private collector 145 14.23 7.13 1 34
Regression 4 (Tax Receivables)
 Tax Receivable per tax revenue 264 108.12 53.92 28.27 396.35
 Gross State Product 264 39.89 7.65 22.90 80.05
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 264 5.56 1.47 3.22 10.66
 Population 264 8.38 1.04 6.41 10.54
 Unemployment rate 264 5.82 2.11 2.60 13.40
 Republican Governor 264 0.53 a 0 1
 Experience with private collector 264 14.39 6.89 1 34
aStandard deviation has limited meaning due to dichotomous variable measure.
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for States Without Private Collection Agency.
Variable n M SD Minimum Maximum
Regression 1 (Tax Court)
 Number of tax appeals per capita 58 0.11 0.17 0.004 0.89
 Gross State Product 58 43.69 11.44 27.97 72.45
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 58 6.38 2.20 3.63 17.53
 Population 58 7.62 1.01 6.20 8.78
 Unemployment rate 58 5.92 2.24 2.50 10.50
 Republican Governor 58 0.48 a 0 1
Regression 2 (Tax Department)
 Number of tax appeals per capita 52 0.13 0.07 0.002 0.28
 Gross State Product 52 40.09 10.81 26.06 72.45
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 52 6.35 2.37 3.63 17.53
 Population 52 7.78 0.82 6.44 8.76
 Unemployment rate 52 5.89 1.93 2.50 10.50
 Republican Governor 52 0.60 a 0 1
Regression 3 (Collection Costs)
 Collection Cost per tax revenue 85 61.98 168.49 1.55 1,049.64
 Gross State Product 85 42.02 11.18 23.94 72.45
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 85 5.90 1.67 3.22 17.53
 Population 85 5,320 5,861 495 36,250
 Unemployment rate 85 5.79 2.10 2.50 10.50
 Republican Governor 85 0.51 a 0 1
Regression 4 (Tax Receivables)
 Tax Receivable per tax revenue 92 100.78 62.21 5.54 434.95
 Gross State Product 92 39.81 8.74 27.93 71.15
 Tax-to-Gross State Product 92 5.76 1.24 3.50 8.25
 Population 92 8.38 7,215 500 37,692
 Unemployment rate 92 5.74 2.21 2.50 10.50
 Republican Governor 92 0.51 a 0 1
aStandard deviation has limited meaning due to dichotomous variable measure.
Table 6. Regression Results.
Tax court Tax department Collection costs Tax receivables




































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .165 .274 .375 .126
() z value z value t value t value
Number of observations 175 85 207 322
Note. AR(1) = first-order autoregressive.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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of collector type. Assuming that all cases are treated similarly 
in the actions of resolution through the informal conference 
and hearing procedures within the tax department, the collec-
tor type should have no differential impact on the internal 
administrative actions. The similar treatment of each case 
leads to similar burdens placed on the internal administration 
for each case. In the case of states with private tax collectors 
and the Republican governor, there are several possible expla-
nations. The first is that constituents challenge the legitimacy 
of the private collector more often in this regime given the 
stance of the Republican party on outsourcing governmental 
functions. A second possible explanation is that the Republican 
governor extends an open invitation to challenging the legiti-
macy of the private collector to assure the constituent that the 
private collector is just as accurate and equitable as the public 
employee. The last potential explanation is that the Republican 
governor sees accessibility as an important aspect of gover-
nance and therefore encourages appeals if the taxpayer thinks 
they have been wronged.
When looking at the external administrative burden, the 
effect of private collection is seen to decrease the number of 
tax appeals filed in the independent tax court. There are 
potentially three explanations affecting this outcome. One 
explanation for these results is the potential collectability of 
the tax case. This explanation would indicate that the private 
collector is assigned to less-complex cases, which when 
challenged in the external tax court, are easily resolved 
thereby reducing the external tax court’s administrative bur-
den. The second explanation is that the taxpayer is filing the 
appeal based on the legitimacy of the private tax collector as 
an instrument of the state. The taxpayer challenges the prem-
ise that a private tax collector is a legitimate tax collector for 
the state. This perception of illegitimacy is quickly found to 
be unsubstantiated within the tax court, thereby reducing the 
external administrative burden. Finally, the reduction in 
external appeals may be due to the efficiency and effective-
ness of the private tax collector, which reduces further adju-
dication of the tax case into the external tax court.
Both the collectability and the issue of legitimacy of the 
private tax collector are similar to the experience of the IRS 
providing some anecdotal evidence to the empirical results. 
In 2004, the American Jobs Creation Act permitted the IRS 
to hire private debt collection agencies (PCA) to assist in the 
collection of delinquent taxes. The request included a pro-
posal to allow the IRS to hire PCAs, with the intent of the 
program to address the buildup of potentially collectible 
inventory that was not being worked by the IRS. The PCAs 
would help collect the aging receivables in exchange for 
commissions based on the amounts collected (Hamilton, 
2003). During the PCA program, hearings occurred in 
Congress regarding the PCAs’ economic incentives to assist 
taxpayers with special needs, the utilization of psychological 
techniques by the PCAs to collect the maximum amount 
from taxpayers, the fear PCAs invoked to frighten taxpayers 
into compliance, and the legitimacy of the PCAs as a 
collector of government debts (Olson, 2007). Legitimacy 
was interpreted in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform 
Act of 1998 (FAIR Act). The act barred federal agencies 
from hiring the private sector to conduct activities regarded 
as inherently governmental. Incorporated in FAIR’s Section 
5, an activity is considered inherently governmental if “it is 
so intimately related to the public interest as to require per-
formance by Federal Government employees,” and necessi-
tates the “exercise of discretion” in applying governmental 
authority or the “making of value judgments relating to mon-
etary transactions and entitlements.” Using both testimony 
and the FAIR Act, Congress discontinued funding the PCA 
program due to its contentious nature, perception of legiti-
macy, resulting in lower overall collections of the aging 
receivables.
Exploring the results for administrative efficiency, the 
results show that private collection decreases state tax depart-
ments’ administrative costs by about US$68 per thousand 
dollars of tax revenue when compared with tax collection by 
public employees. This supports the third hypothesis that 
infers shirking under the fixed-wage contract is larger than 
the agency cost under the incentive-based contract in tax col-
lection. Although the second measure of administrative 
effectiveness indicates a potential reduction in the delinquent 
tax inventory over time through private collection agencies, 
the results are statistically insignificant, leading to a rejection 
of Hypothesis 4. The conclusion is that private collectors do 
not statistically reduce the ratio of tax receivables to tax rev-
enues in state tax departments.
Although the discussion of the results has focused on the 
hypothesized relationships, the findings indicate that the 
proxy measures for administrative burden and procedural 
fairness are affected by the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the state. Increases in the tax burden, population, and unem-
ployment rate reduces collection costs whereas increasing 
the tax burden reduces tax receivables. Turning our attention 
to the external tax court appeals, population and Republican 
governorship reduce the number of appeals while increases 
in prior experience with the private collector increases the 
number of appeals, although this effect is quite small. 
Looking at the number of internal tax appeals to the state tax 
department, only states with both private collectors and 
Republican governors are affected, in this case those states 
are expected to see an increase in the number of internal tax 
appeals to the state tax department, an indication of an 
increase in internal administrative burden.
Robustness Check
As observed in Table 6, the effect of the tax base is insignifi-
cant across all of the estimates. To assess changes in specifi-
cation, we offer all four models with our control for state tax 
base removed. We offer these results in Table 7. Our finding 
is that our variable of interest, private collection agency, is 
virtually unaffected by the change in specification of the 
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model. We conclude that our results are robust to changes in 
the tax base within the state.
Conclusion
This study provides an examination of the state tax collection 
process, exploring questions about the government’s con-
tractual choice of tax collection methods, outsourcing or 
insourcing the tax receivables collection process. To explore 
this understudied aspect of the governments’ tax collection 
process, effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness in the collec-
tion process of tax receivables were explored.
Since the 1980s, many state governments have instituted 
innovations associated with using private debt collection 
agencies to recover their tax debts. Given the paucity of 
empirical research regarding this innovative practice, the 
empirical analyses presented the effects of using private tax 
collectors in tax administration in state governments. 
Through the use of a unique state panel data set spanning the 
time period from 2000 to 2011, the findings lead to two 
important conclusions in tax administration.
While the empirical results are mixed, the two implica-
tions are that tax collection outsourcing leads to a modest 
effect on procedural fairness, but the degree of the effect is 
affected by the governor’s party affiliation. Private tax col-
lectors are statistically similar to public employees with 
regard to the number of tax appeals that are first filed inter-
nally with the state in the tax appeal division. When there is 
a private collector and a Republican governor, the effect is an 
increase in appeals with the internal tax department. When 
we look at the effects on cases advancing to external tax 
courts, the findings show that private tax collectors reduce 
the number of appeals in the external tax court. Taking the 
point estimates, the increase in internal tax appeals offsets 
the decrease in external tax appeals for those states with both 
the private collector and a Republican governor.
When looking at the implications of private tax collectors 
on the costs of tax administration, the findings show a 
decrease in costs; however, the private collector does not 
influence the amount of tax receivables accrued. Although 
private collection is not financially effective in terms of 
reducing the ratio of taxes receivable to tax revenue, private 
collection is financially efficient in terms of administrative 
cost savings.
These mixed effects of contemporary tax collection out-
sourcing may be due to differences between the historical 
behavior of tax farmers and the contemporary contracting out 
of delinquent taxes. The contemporary contracting out is a 
hybrid-privatized tax collection system, whereas the early his-
torical tax farming was completely privatized. The current 
outsourcing of delinquent tax collection supplements the pub-
lic tax collection agencies, while the early historical tax farm-
ing was a substitute for the bureaucratic collection system. 
Contemporary contracting out in tax collection differs from 
historical tax farming in terms of the extent to which the tax-
payer is protected by legal and administrative systems. The 
effects of the historical practice of tax farming on administra-
tive effectiveness, efficiency, and procedural fairness are clear; 
Table 7. Robustness Check.
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() z value z value t value t value
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Note. AR(1) = first-order autoregressive.
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tax farming had a strong positive effect on effectiveness and 
efficiency and a strong negative effect on fairness. The results 
of these analyses observe that the effects of the contemporary 
practice of tax collection outsourcing are moderate, indicating 
that outsourcing has moderated the effects on the benefits to 
administrative effectiveness, efficiency, and the harms in pro-
cedural fairness.
The findings of this study are interesting and they do pro-
vide much to consider, but they have limitations and poten-
tial for additional research. The sample used required a series 
of proxies due to data limitations. The measures for our 
appeals, both internal and external, provide no information 
on how they were adjudicated; only the count of appeals is 
provided. Moreover, none of the states report the amounts of 
delinquent taxes independent of tax receivables. These limi-
tations, based on data, could be addressed in future research. 
In the future, research can enhance this preliminary study by 
enhancing the measures presented in this study, addressing 
issues related to variation among the contracting states, and 
examining the effect of state delinquent tax outsourcing 
more completely. This would allow an extension of this 
study, providing valuable information to states, which are 
considering the use of private collection agencies.
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Notes
1. For simplification, we use the word “state tax department” 
when we mention state agencies responsible for tax collection 
although the name of agency may vary by state. For the same 
reason, we use the word “tax court” and “the independent tax 
appeal agency” interchangeably because tax court is the rep-
resentative (or exemplary) form of the independent tax appeal 
agency.
2. As suggested by one of the reviewers, the endogeneity of the 
use of private collectors is an important issue. Following the 
reviewer’s suggestion, we use OLS to estimate a difference-in-
difference (DiD) model using a series of dummy and interac-
tion variables. Qualitatively, we come to a similar conclusion 
as our fixed and random effects estimates. The issue that arose 
using the DiD method is the parallel trends assumption. To 
test the parallel trends assumption, we follow the work of 
Mora and Reggio (2013). Unfortunately, the results are that 
the trends do differ between treated and control states in our 
sample, thereby violating the parallel trends assumption.
3. Prais–Winsten estimation is a type of feasible generalized least 
squares to correct for first-order autoregressive, AR(1), which 
indicates that the prior year’s tax appeals affect the current 
year’s tax appeals, which is the most usual type of serial correla-
tion. In panel data, the time serial correlation is a more important 
problem than heteroskedasticity “because it usually has a larger 
impact on standard errors and the efficiency of estimators than 
does heteroskedasticity” (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 435).
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